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Abstract  This article aims to analyse the current 
European obsession with the practice of veiling. What 
emerges from this analysis is that the regulation of clothes 
and images in the public sphere is an integral part of 
European history and emerges as a necessary act of 
sovereign power aimed at instituting a precise law and 
religious subject through regulation of the licit form of 
visibility in the public sphere. This act, reinforced by the 
promulgation of exceptional rules of law, is necessary to 
maintain the unity and homogeneity of European people, in 
the past as well as nowadays. 
Keywords  Headscarf Debate, Gender, Symbology of 
Clothes, Sovereignty, Power of Images, Secular/Religious 
Powers 
1. Introduction
In recent years, the female headscarf has been at the centre 
of many polemical debates in Europe. Politicians, judges, 
journalists and columnists have even ‘over-debated’ the 
practice of veiling in the secular European public space, 
filling pages of journals and social media with stories of 
Muslim women who have been forbidden to work, to walk in 
a public place, to have appropriate education, and even to 
stand in a court room, because they are veiled. The obsession 
with women’s veiling has led to a juridical regulation of 
women’s body in many European countries. In 2004, France 
enacted the first bill to forbid ‘religious symbols’ in public 
schools while in 2010 it banned the full-face-veil from any 
public space [1]. In Germany, five German Landers, despite 
allowing the display of Christian symbols, adopted a law that 
banned Islamic symbols in public schools, while Austria and 
Belgium prohibited the full-face veil in public places, courts 
and schools [2]. At the same time, in the ‘multicultural’ UK, 
Shabina Begum, a young British student, was forbidden to 
attend school because she started to wear a jilbab instead of 
the uniform chosen by the school in consultation with three 
local imams [3]. The European Court of Human Rights’ 
(ECHR) decisions, by applying a wide margin of 
appreciation,1 confirm those of European national courts. 
Although the veil has been worn for centuries by women in 
Arab-Islamic culture to communicate different meanings 
based on the specific context in which the practice is 
performed [4,5], the female headscarf has come to be defined 
as a ‘religious symbol incompatible with western secular 
values of gender equality’ [3, 6, 7, 8]. Those legal decisions 
support the view of many western scholars and 
commentators who see in the veil the symbol of something 
intrinsically ‘other’ while claiming the necessity of 
forbidding the veil in order to advance gender equality [9, 10, 
11, 12] (as the veil is considered to be attire imposed on 
women that hides their bodies from the public space) and 
liberal/secular democratic principles (as it is considered to be 
a ‘backward religious symbol’ in contrast with 
secular/liberal values) [13, 14]. Many of the debates over 
women’s attire rely on a fundamental dichotomy between 
secular and religious, modernity and tradition, women’s 
freedom and un-freedom: this binary opposition has become 
the main domain through which to read the current debate in 
Europe. In this context, (Muslim) women emerge as subjects 
needing to be ‘saved’ from a backward and chauvinist 
religion or as the enemy of western democratic values. 
Instead of analysing the matter of the veil through 
oppositional (western) categories, in this article I will 
address the dichotomy represented and fabricated over 
(Muslim) women’s body through an anthropological, 
historical and political analysis of clothing regulation in 
Europe. As I shall point out, far from being a recent 
‘European obsession’, the regulation of women’s attire is an 
integral part of European history and emerges as a useful tool 
to create unity and homogeneity in a people: this ‘necessary’ 
act of sovereign power aims at creating a specific law and 
1 The margin of appreciation plays an important role in remitting certain 
kinds of judgements to democratically elected officials who are said to know 
the particular context of their country better. It is usually employed by the 
ECHR when there is no formal European consensus on particular topics or 
where the issue is particularly controversial [50]. 
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religious subject through the control of the visible in the 
public liberal/secular sphere. 
I will critically address this argument through the analysis 
of two leading cases decided at the ECHR: Sahin v. Turkey 
[6], and Dahlab v. Switzerland [7]. Although diverse 
European national courts have disclosed different concepts 
of secularism, subject’s autonomy and women’s freedom in 
dealing with the matter, 2  I consider these cases to 
exemplify the European obsession with (Muslim) women’s 
clothes. Sahin, a young university student at Istanbul 
University, was denied access to a written examination 
because she was veiled. As no university in the country 
allowed the wearing of the veil, she was forced to move to 
Vienna University in order to complete her studies. After a 
long legal dispute in national courts, the case reached the 
ECHR and in 2005 the Grand Chamber decided that the 
university’s refusal to allow her to wear a headscarf was 
justified under the exception made by Article 9 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights on freedom of 
thought and religion.3 The ECHR found that the ban on 
wearing the veil applied by the university was sought to 
‘preserve the secular nature of the institution concerned’ [6] 
(para 116) and so was considered admissible. In the case, 
the Court defined the wearing of the veil as a symbol of 
affiliation with religious/political movements. However, the 
Court failed to prove the existence of extremist Islamist 
groups in the university and to explain the relation between 
the claimant and those groups. It also failed to give 
evidence that wearing a headscarf in a higher educational 
institution can ‘pressure students who are not wearing the 
hijab’ [6] (para 111). Dahlab v Switzerland [7] concerns a 
teacher in a primary school in Switzerland who, after a 
period of deep spiritual searching, converted to Islam and 
started to wear the hijab. Ms. Dahlab wore the veil for four 
years without telling students that she had converted to Islam 
[7] (456). The Director General of Public Education asked 
her to remove the veil: when Dahlab refused, alleging her 
right to wear the headscarf, she was dismissed. The ECHR, 
                                                          
2 In France, for instance, the banning of the veil has been framed in the 
name of state neutrality and public order (as wearing the headscarf has been 
considered a practice that challenges French social cohesion as well as 
secular principles) [51]. In Germany, eight Länder have passed a law 
prohibiting the wearing of the veil in public institutions in the name of 
‘religious pluralism’ and for the ‘protection of the Christian traditions’ of the 
country [52]: thus, “while in France the notion of secularity has been 
interpreted in terms of a rupture from the Christian past, in Germany it has 
been regarded as implying a continuity of the Christian tradition” [53]. In 
the United Kingdom, where the government has taken a more flexible 
approach to cultural diversity, recent legal controversies in relation to the 
wearing of the veil at work and within educational institutions have 
re-opened the discussion about multiculturalism. Although national 
European courts have framed the issue of veiling differently, (Muslim) 
women’s body remains at the centre of many polemical debates in Europe. 
3 Article 9 ‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’. ‘9. 1 Everyone 
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 9.2 Freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
in line with the Swiss Court, pointed out that Switzerland 
was pursuing a legitimate aim to ban the hijab in public 
schools in the name of gender equality (as the veil has been 
seen by the judges as a chauvinist practice imposed by the 
Koran) and state neutrality, considered an expression of the 
state’s secularism. Ms. Dahlab’s claim was dismissed and 
she was accused of proselytism although the Court could not 
prove that the claimant had pursued any proselytizing 
activities in the work place. In both cases, as well as in other 
European national juridical decisions over the female 
headscarf, the veil emerges as a ‘religious symbol’ in 
contrast with western liberal/democratic principles and 
veiled Muslim women as ‘imaginary enemies’ who threat 
western society. 
But how can a simple article of clothing be understood to 
‘threaten’ civil life? Why do clothes, particularly the female 
veil, have such an important place in western liberal 
democracy? Why, despite the wide plurality and 
performative outcomes of the practice, has the veil been 
defined as the ‘symbol of’ a monolithic and static belonging? 
As Hansen argues, “because [clothing] both touches the 
body and faces outward others, dress has a dual quality… 
this two-sided quality invites us to explore both the 
individual and collective identities that the dressed body 
enables” [15] (p. 372). This is the why, in European history, 
clothes have always occupied a special place. In Medieval 
Europe, for instance, sumptuary laws4 were promulgated in 
periods of socio-political change in order to ‘differentiate’ 
between ‘citizens’ but also to ‘homologate’ as a means of 
strengthening a sense of national identity. 
What is of particular interest in the study of clothing 
regulation is that although the promulgation of rules related 
to the individual’s attire changed based on specific 
socio/historical periods, what remains constant in European 
history is an obsession with the regulation of women’s 
clothes, especially women’s veils. It is enough to look at how 
the matter of veiling has been historically negotiated to 
understand that the practice has been invested with different 
(ambiguous) meanings and values, and hence legally 
enforced or prohibited. 
The history of European obsession with the juridical 
regulation of women’s attire indicates that clothes have been 
intended as images, symbols and metaphors of a specific 
internal self, and, for this reason, they have the power to 
operate a visible differentiation, a boundary, a clear-cut 
dividing line, between citizens and foreigners and between 
the different classes of citizens [16]: through clothes, 
symbols and metaphors it is thus possible to conceptualize 
nationality, geography and gender, as it is through the visible 
that the public sphere comes to be shaped. I argue that since 
“forms of dress, as with forms of architecture, are not [only] 
mere metaphors for the power and authority of the political 
state [but] they instantiate the power and authority of the 
                                                          
4  “Sumptuary laws are attempts to regulate any kind of consumption, 
especially conspicuous consumption”. [23] (p. 23) 
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political state,” [17] (p. xv) the sovereign power has always 
had a particular interest in regulating clothes in the public 
sphere. In essence, since clothes have been conceived as 
images, and images have the power to rhetorically construct 
(visible) forms of knowledge, the definition attached to a 
particular article of clothing emerges as an act of sovereign 
power aimed at maintaining the unity and homogeneity of a 
people [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]: this, in turn, recalls the form of 
governmentality described by Schmitt [20, 21, 22]. In this 
view, the exclusion of many Muslim women from the public 
sphere is a necessary sovereign act to maintain unity and 
homogeneity in a fractured Europe. Through the juridical 
regulation of symbols and images in the public sphere, the 
sovereign not only gives to specific practices their proper 
place within the borders of the state but also, more 
importantly, it constitutes a specific law’s subject obedient to 
a particular ‘order of things’ and faithful to an absolute and 
transcendent power. The ‘politics of dress’, then, which is an 
integral part of European history, not only reveals a certain 
anxiety in relation to clothing regulation, but also, more 
importantly, it is an example of the state’s increasing 
intrusion into the private life of its citizens. This, in turn, 
reveals all the paradoxes of western/secular liberalism which 
creates a contradictory ‘secular/liberal’ subject: one who is 
free and, at the same time, compelled. In fact, if, on the one 
hand, the individual has rights (in the case, the right to 
express a religious belief by wearing a veil), then on the other, 
those rights can be threatened according to how the society 
and the nation-state want them to be regulated. 
2. Law, Power, and the ‘Veiled Body’ 
In the course of European history, rulers have spent 
considerable time and effort to promulgate laws related to the 
individual’s apparel in the public sphere: in the Roman 
Empire, for instance, citizens sentenced to exile were 
forbidden to wear the toga, which was used to distinguish 
between the ‘citizen’ and the ‘barbarian’. Similarly, the so 
called ‘Sumptuary laws’, promulgated throughout European 
history to restrict luxury and extravagance, emerge as an 
“intrinsic element in the formation of the modern legal [and 
social] order…. [based on the] identification of ‘imagined 
communities’… [as well as] moods of nation, class,… 
gender”, and visible social hierarchies [16] (p. 708–9). 
With the rise of Christianity in Europe, the place assigned 
to the body assumed a particular importance due to the 
“complex interconnection between flesh and cloth, between 
the naked and the clothed and their interplay, as with 
diaphanous materials that expose rather than conceal” [23] (p. 
221): in fact, in teleological terms, clothes have been 
conceived through their symbolic meaning, as images, 
metaphors, of a specific order of things [16, 24]. Like every 
image, clothing has the potential to include and exclude and 
to delineate gendered territorial borders of an ‘imagined 
community’ [24, 25] as they express uniformity, hierarchy 
and regularity [17; 26]. 
Tertullian’s interest in apparel, for instance, reveals how 
regulation of the proper clothes to be exposed in the public 
sphere should mirror a divine transcendental order [27]. In 
his treatise, clothes emerge as a powerful image of an 
‘ordered society’ through which the individual reads and 
interprets the external world, which, in turn, shapes her/his 
internal soul [16]: in other words, the external world should 
mirror the individual’s internal ‘being’. In fact, clothes do 
not only “make the human body visible” [17] (p. 1–2) as they 
are located at the border between the internal self and the 
external world, but also, more importantly, their symbolic 
meaning is understood as a semiotic code which shapes our 
and others’ perceptions of the world [28]. 
Significantly, both Tertullian’s treatise and the sumptuary 
laws promulgated in Medieval Europe focused mainly on the 
legal regulation of women’s clothes: as dress is part of 
gender identity and represents an important mechanism for 
reproducing gender relations, “it follows that projects 
concerned with the regulation of dress must, whether 
intentionally or not, have an impact on the regulation of 
gender. It should be borne in mind that clothing works both 
ways; it is both a means of reading others and a means of 
displaying the identity of the wearer” [23] (p. 216). Thus, 
sumptuary law not only “manifests itself as a concern to 
establish some natural and stable connection between sex, 
gender and social role” [23] (p.217) but also, more 
importantly, it shows how women’s body assumes an 
increasing importance in delineating matters of gender, 
territoriality and social status. 
Hunt [23] suggests that anxiety toward women’s attire and 
its legal regulation was strictly related to the controllability 
of women and emerges as a central part of the ‘political 
economy of marriage’ which is exemplified in the links 
between the dowry system and the promulgation of specific 
sumptuary laws. He notices that the rise of the nuclear family 
has been “associated with the rise of more public forms of 
control…. shifting sites of the private and public” [23] (p. 
237). A particular interest in women’s body is an important 
feature in Medieval Europe and it “stems from the notion that 
God’s incarnation in the body of man was also his 
humiliation.” The ‘original sin’, which manifests itself in the 
opposition between knowledge and faith, was transformed 
into ‘sexual sin’, “a sin that revolved around and was 
encapsulated in the body of women” [23] (p.222–3). As 
Burghartz [29] argues, “it becomes clear that the question of 
the right gender order, the right universally apparent social 
order and the godly moral order were tightly entangled with 
one another” (p.12). Interestingly, this entanglement has 
been represented by and fabricated over the women’s veil, 
which in thirteenth century Europe acquires a growing 
symbolic importance in defining questions of women’s 
modesty, gender difference, social status and social order 
[29]. 
Vecellio observes that although it was customary for 
Venetian women to reveal the face, in the 1550s older 
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women started to wear a black veil when going to church or 
during mourning, while in the 1590s young unmarried girls 
started to use a white veil to cover the face and bosom. In 
adulthood, Venetian women wore the cappa, a black cloak 
that covered the face, while noble or upper-class women 
were accustomed to living secluded within domestic walls 
[29]. Likewise, drawing from the Lutheran reformer Paul 
Rebhun, who introduced women’s compulsory veiling, the 
1523 Luis Vives’ manual for Christian women clearly takes 
the position that married women should be seen less in public 
as their devotion should be only for their husbands: he claims 
that in contrast to many Middle Eastern countries in which 
women observe the practice of veiling, European women 
“wore veils that allowed them to observe other people 
unimpeded, without themselves being visible. This needed to 
be stopped in the name of preventing immorality; women 
should cover their faces not with veils, but with decorum” 
[29] (p. 6). 
Women’s attire was not only related to their obedience to a 
specific gendered social order, but it also expressed the 
social status of male family members: for instance in 1474 a 
law on social status was promulgated in Bologna which 
stated that wives and daughters of knights should dress in 
gold, women related to bankers and notaries should wear 
only sleeves of gold, for those related to artisans the 
appropriate legal colour was crimson, while lower class 
women were allowed to dress only in crimson [23]. Thus, as 
Goodrich [16] argues, 
“a person’s place in the imaginary order of nation 
or class was also a question of the order of 
images…, the regulation of dress, ornament, and 
food was linked to a theological and moral concern 
with the proper signs of identity and community. 
The legislation of the licit image of a person was 
linked indissolubly to the order of images and the 
role of symbols, of…the ‘visible world’ in public 
and private life” (p. 711-2). 
If everybody had their proper place in a ‘well-ordered 
society’, women’s place was mainly associated with 
respectability, modesty, austerity and morality. In Siena, for 
instance, sumptuary law prescribed a specific length for 
women’s skirts (whereas only married women could wear 
long trains) while in Florence, in 1464, sumptuary laws were 
more concerned with women’s décolletage; women were 
allowed to wear a décolletage three centimetres below the 
collarbone [23]. 
The medieval obsession with the legal regulation of 
women’s attire was particularly emphatic during periods of 
political change: while the theological dispute between 
Luther and the Reformers focused mainly on the relationship 
between internal belief and external observance expressed in 
‘signs’ [29], the 1075 Gregorian reforms expressed a 
particular anxiety over women’s clothing regulation. Those 
anxieties toward women’s body mirrored the wider juridical 
struggle between secular and religious authority over the 
jurisdiction of family law and moral offences. In fact, 
although there was a general consensus over the inferiority of 
women, secular and religious power had constructed 
different discourses in relation to the ‘woman question’: for 
the Church, women’s identity should be related to morality 
because sings of luxury were seen as a sin, while within 
secular discourse, women’s luxury was associated with the 
‘economic wrong of extravagance’ [23]. This anxiety was 
symbolically expressed in the struggle over the female veil; 
on the one hand, the veil was seen by the Church as a sign of 
religious piety and sexual modesty while on the other, 
seculars saw it as alluring because it facilitated the 
concealment of identity: as a matter of fact, in Siena, officials 
were obliged to ask veiled women the name of their father or 
husband. What was at stake in this battle was the “degree of 
freedom veils allowed for assignations that breached 
patriarchal control and exhibited some degree of personal 
and sexual licence. This is borne out by the fact that 
prostitutes were frequently forbidden to wear the veil” [23] 
(p. 223). Besides, there was always strict cooperation 
between secular and religious authorities: “in Italy, in 
particular, there is evidence that the targeting of women 
points to the presence of the ecclesiastical hand behind 
sumptuary law during the Middle Ages. The morality of 
women was a central preoccupation and dress and 
ornamentation was the readily visible sign of immorality; the 
immoral character could be read from the immodest clothing” 
[23] (p.239–40). The distinction between the ‘respectable’ 
and the ‘depraved’ woman is mirrored in the many norms 
promulgated in that period: in 1351, the London Dress 
Ordinance imposed a strict dress code for prostitutes but 
highlighted that it had no value if the prostitute was of noble 
birth. In 1360, in Paris, a law forbade prostitutes to wear 
embroidered coverings, while in 1415 a statute was devoted 
exclusively to prostitutes’ clothes in order to distinguish the 
‘depraved’ from the ‘respectable’ woman and to avoid 
misunderstandings [23]. 
The obsession with the women’s veil is also attested in the 
analysis of the many legal cases decided throughout Europe: 
in Basel in 1705, for instance, the Reformation Magistrates 
decided the case of seven women who entered a church 
without the Sturz (a traditional hood of stiff material). One of 
them claimed that she could not wear it due to her fragile 
constitution, two claimed ignorance of the normative relating 
to the veil, and the others justified it on the ground of poverty: 
the judges forgave the poor women and fined the others. A 
large fine was also imposed on Jacob Mechel when in 1709 
his wife could not wear the Sturz because she was pregnant, 
and on many other husbands whose wives did not conform to 
the strict regulations [29]. 
Clothes regulations, however, were not only implemented 
to ‘differentiate’ between citizens, but also to create unity 
and homogeneity: in 1337 Edward III of England forbade the 
importation and wearing of foreign clothes, except for the 
royal family. The law stated that anyone acting or dressing as 
an ‘Egyptian’, a gypsy or a stranger was to be declared 
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outlaw. Hence, if, on the one hand, clothes were regulated to 
establish class/group/gender differentiation, then on the 
other the ‘English man’ was to be recognized exactly by his 
clothes [30]. As, traditionally, external signs were considered 
the mark of internal states, “legal concern with dress was a 
concern both with the indigenous, with a vernacular civility 
free of the stranger…and with all other cults that were 
suggestive of traditions and forces extrinsic to the native soil” 
[30] (p. 88). Therefore, not only do clothes provide a sense of 
belonging but also, more importantly, they delineate the 
border between ‘citizen’ and ‘foreigner’: the first is included 
within the pale of the law, while the latter comes to be 
excluded by the law [16]. As identity is built through the 
negation of the ‘image of the other’, the rejection of ‘foreign’ 
clothes (with their specific shapes, cuts, and colours) is a 
precise political strategy to avoid ‘foreign vices’ and to 
create a sense of national belonging. Clothes, then, have been 
legally regulated not only to create the image of an ‘ordered 
society’, but also, more importantly, to build a fixed image of 
a territorial unified (imagined) community. In fact, as 
Anderson [25] argues, a nation is an ‘imagined community’, 
which implies a process of imaginistic individual identity 
formation whereas people recognize themselves as 
belonging to a particular group/community: this sense of 
belonging is negatively constructed through the 
differentiation and contraposition between the ‘self’ and the 
‘other’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, whereas symbols provide a 
clear-cut dividing line between different imaginaries, a 
useful tools to create unity and homogeneity through the 
figurative construction of an ‘imagined’ ‘national’ history, 
culture, and tradition. As individuals’ perceptions are 
codified through images which work on an individual’s 
pre-symbolic level, nationalism appropriates metaphors and 
symbols in the public sphere to create a specific paradigmatic 
and binary opposition between the self, citizen of the 
territorial ‘nation-state’, and the other, the ‘outsider’ [31]. 
The tension between religious and secular jurisdiction 
over women’s body regulation expressed in the past came to 
an end with the fusion of secular and spiritual power [32, 33] 
and the birth of nation states in Europe; women’s body 
acquired a new meaning in the construction of the (national) 
‘imagined community’. In fact, within nationalist discourse 
women are seen as the biological/ethnic/cultural reproducer 
of the community; they symbolize ‘national boundaries’, the 
signifier of ethnic/cultural differences, the image of the 
‘other’. By metaphorically constructing the ‘image of the 
nation’ through women’s body, the nation-state creates new 
gendered/national subjectivities which mirror and reproduce 
specific (national) cultural values: as Massad [34] observes, 
“metaphors of nationalist movements are not only metaphors. 
They also reflect the fundamental assumptions of nationalist 
thought, which establishes the future gender constitution and 
gender roles of nationalist agents” (p. 469). 
The veil, which, in teleological terms, has been seen as a 
sign of women’s modesty and legally imposed, ironically 
re-emerges in the eighteenth century as a ‘sign of’ women’s 
fashion and in the nineteenth century as a fixed symbol of 
national belonging. In 1934, Turkey, for instance, banned the 
wearing of religious symbols in the public sphere, including 
the veil: the prohibition mirrored the attempt to create a 
strong, unified, and homogeneous nation-state through the 
juridical regulation of women’s body in the public sphere 
[35]. 
But only since the colonial encounter has the veil come to 
symbolize an intrinsic difference between the ‘east’ and the 
‘west’. In fact, the veil has been constructed by colonizers as 
the symbol of the backwardness of Muslim culture, while 
“standing in the relation of antithesis to thesis… [the 
colonized have] reversed – but thereby also accepted – the 
terms set in the first place by the colonizers” [5] (p. 151) by 
elevating the veil as the symbol of their nationalist struggles. 
This is clear when studying the history of Algeria and Egypt, 
for instance, where banning the practice of veiling was one of 
the first legal reforms of the colonizers, but also in Turkey 
and Iran, where the newly created nation-state elevated 
veiling (along with ‘unveiling’, as in the case of Turkey) as a 
visible symbol of national belonging. 
3. The Symbology of the ‘Otherness’ 
The idea that dress can cause ‘disruption’, or that it can be 
intended as ‘a threat to the values of a society’, as in the 
current never-ending legal debate over the veil, shows that it 
is not the simple article of clothing but the symbology 
attributed to it that can threaten the status quo. While in the 
past the veil has assumed different meanings, nowadays it 
has become the symbol of women’s oppression and of 
incompatible backward religious values, although in Muslim 
majority societies the veil carries different meanings [4, 5]. 
The definition of veiling as a fixed ‘religious symbol 
incompatible with democratic values of tolerance and gender 
equality’ is an important feature in the European discourse 
over the veil. The power of symbols is well known in critical 
legal theory; through symbols and images, it is possible to 
understand what cannot be said directly as images remind us 
of ancestral myths still unattached to the symbols of 
institutional prose [30]. Since symbols have the power to 
create an illusion of presence and attachment to what is 
‘un-representable’, then images are the point of fracture 
which defines the boundaries between the inside and outside 
of the law, as the ‘veiled’ woman, through her clothes, 
represents the boundaries of citizenship. In fact, as clothes 
have been regarded as a ‘symbol’, a ‘visible image’ of a 
different ‘other’, they have always been normatively 
regulated by the law through a sovereign act: garments 
operate a visible differentiation, a boundary, a clear-cut 
dividing line between citizens and foreigners and between 
the different classes of citizens. 
The question that arises from this reading is who defines 
the meaning of a certain symbol? Who decides if the veil is a 
‘religious symbol’ or not? If there is a wide literature about 
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Islam and the use of the veil which points out the different 
uses and meanings of the hijab, why are states so concerned 
to regulate (Muslim) women’s attire? 
As Asad [36] points out, the banning of the veil can be 
understood as an exercise of sovereign power, as it is the 
sovereign that decides which symbol is to be regarded as 
‘religious’ and, consequently, it acquires the power to shape 
the public sphere. Since the definition of ‘religious symbols’ 
becomes a juridical matter, the sovereign gains the 
teleological and transcendental power to impose those 
definitions on its subjects. The necessity of a sovereign 
power who decides upon exceptions is clear in the Stasi 
Commission’s report5 which points out that the donning of 
the veil overloads teachers and public officers as they “are 
often left isolated, in a difficult environment to define which 
‘religious symbol’ can be legitimate in a public school” [37]. 
It is also clear in the Sahin case [5], in which the ECHR, 
through a considerable emphasis on state neutrality and 
secular values, along with the distinction made by art. 9 
between faith and its manifestation,6 widened the ‘margin of 
appreciation’, leaving considerable discretion to states to 
define what kind of religious manifestations are allowed in 
the secular public space. By stressing the principle of 
secularism, the Court not only limited Sahin’s individual 
rights of freedom of religion, but it also “assumed the 
religious task of describing which Islamic duties are suitable 
to be performed at secular universities; practicing Muslim 
students in Turkish universities are free ‘to manifest their 
religion in accordance with habitual forms of Muslim 
observance’ (para 118 and 159)”[38] (p. 273).7 Thus, if it is 
the sovereign power that decides exceptions and defines 
symbols, then “all modern concepts of the state are 
secularized theological concepts” [39] (p. 128) as the state 
assumes the teleological, transcendent and absolute power of 
defining images and metaphors in the public sphere: this is 
mirrored not only in past regulations over women’s attire, 
but also, more importantly, in the recent ECHR legal 
decisions over the practice of veiling. In this sense, 
“[the] secular state today abides … by the cuius 
regio eius religio principle (the religion of the ruler 
is the religion of his subjects), even though it 
disclaims any religious allegiance and governs a 
largely irreligious society…[in fact] it is not the 
commitment to…a particular religion that is most 
                                                          
5 The Stasi Commission was set up by the French Government in order to 
investigate the application of the principle of laicite in France. 
6 In the ECHR’s decisions, the term ‘practice’ in article 9 (1) “does not 
cover each act which is motivated or influenced by a religion or belief”. In 
fact, the manifestation should be one of the “normal and recognized 
manifestations” of religion or belief that “actually express the belief 
concerned” [54] (para 19, 20). 
7 Clearly, the ECHR has identified ‘religion’ as a force that aspires to 
regulate human life and to subordinate secular to religious values: it relies on 
the assumption that religion should be relegated to a small private sphere in 
order to safeguard a wider secular public sphere. However, by defining 
religion as a simple private belief, not only has the Court circumscribed the 
role and place assigned to religion and religious practices but it has also 
imposed a narrow definition of religion on other cultures [55]. 
significant in this principle but the installation of a 
single absolute power – the sovereign state – 
drawn from a single abstract source and facing a 
single political task: the worldly care of its 
population regardless of its beliefs. The state is 
now transcendent as well as a representative agent” 
[36] (p. 94). 
In essence, as religion directs people to other loyalties and 
other ‘worldly-powers’, the state, the Leviathan, has to 
define its place in the worldly care of its population in order 
to assure the loyalty of the Christian/secular8 law’s subject 
to a transcendental absolute power embodied in the 
sovereign who controls the public sphere through regulatory 
mechanisms that ‘normalize’ and ‘naturalize’ the private life 
of its subjects. 
Therefore, if on the one hand liberal polity tries to operate 
a separation between private and public, spiritual and 
temporal, then on the other, the state takes the responsibility 
of creating Christian/secular citizens by regulating their 
private life, ethics, and sentiments through the control of 
symbols in the public sphere. By defining what the 
appropriate attire is for (Muslim) women, the sovereign state 
defines not only its subjects by ‘clearing’ the public sphere of 
‘intrusive symbols’, but also the proper place for religion by 
bringing private sentiments into the public scrutiny of the 
secular polity. Thus, citizenship emerges as something that is 
constructed by an act of sovereignty, while the 
Christian/secular/liberal citizen becomes “a particular kind 
of contradictory individual – one who is morally sovereign 
and yet obedient to the laws of the secular republic, flexible 
and tolerant yet fiercely principled” [36] (p 104); a ‘citizen’ 
able to take part in the ‘game of the sign’ and thus show her 
loyalty to the absolute sovereign power. Through an exercise 
of sovereignty, the absolute power defines subjectivities by 
shaping the public space through the force of the law while 
defining the public limits of religious sentiments: 
paradoxically, the sovereign state “realizes its universal 
character through a particular (female Muslim) identity, that 
is, a particular psychological internality” [36] (p. 98). 
But why does the sovereign state need an exercise of 
sovereignty to limit women’s attire? Why, in the case of the 
‘Muslim’ veil, was this act necessary to ‘save’ democratic 
values? 
Based on Schmitt’s analysis, what is important in a 
democracy is the ‘unity’ of a people, which is based on some 
sort of ‘substantial homogeneity’ and is symbolized in the 
figure of the sovereign. He argues that it is through the 
concept of ‘substantial homogeneity’ that it is possible to 
create a particular identity, able to clearly distinguish itself 
from other (foreign) identities [20]. This homogeneity, 
however, is based on an illusion, a ‘fabrication’, a ‘false 
consciousness’ constructed in order to maintain a 
                                                          
8 I have chosen to use this term because I see a continuation between 
Christianity and the secular [32, 33]. 
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homogeneous ‘imagined’ unity; as Anderson [25] argues, 
communities “are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are 
imagined” (p. 6). Unity and homogeneity are established 
through a certain form of ‘affective identity’ which is 
translated into the ‘affective’ attachment to a unity 
represented by the sovereign. This ‘affective attachment’ is 
formed through the control and juridical regulation of 
symbols and metaphors in the public sphere [30]. As a matter 
of fact, historically, the appropriation of images and icons 
was compounded with the implementation of rules related to 
clothes as they have always represented cultural boundaries, 
accepted or rejected images of an (imaginary) community. 
Unity and identity, which coincide in Schmitt’s analysis [21], 
become essential pillars of the political: unity is formed by 
an (imagined) common identity, while identity is shaped 
through the appropriation and legal regulation of what is 
visible in the public sphere. It is exactly in the name of a 
European (imagined) homogeneous identity, in the past as 
well as today, that the ‘veiled woman’ becomes the symbol 
of a fixed (Muslim) world which looks like the dictatorship 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
For Schmitt, to create a unified homogeneity, politics 
needs to create a contrast, a differentiation between 
homogeneity and plurality as pluralism threatens the 
sovereignty of the state and the existence of a (valuable) 
concept of politics; in fact, in pluralist theories the autonomy 
of the social system would not guarantee the unity of the 
system itself because “the state simply transforms itself into 
an association which competes with other associations” [27] 
(p. 44). Thus, plural theories threaten not only the unity and 
homogeneity of a people, but also the legitimacy and the 
sovereignty of the state, as the problem of conflicting 
loyalties arises. To maintain a homogeneous character, the 
sovereign needs citizens to be loyal to an absolute and 
transcendental power, the only one able to defend the ‘being’ 
of a people against ‘intrusions’. Consequently, “conflict is 
possible as a structure of difference, and such a structure is 
only possible as a differentiation of unities … [which makes] 
the origin of politics already political, already a battle about 
what constitutes a politically legitimate unity” [40] (p. 2). 
Hence, what really threatens western societies is not a 
veiled woman, but the pluralism she represents. Not only is 
Islam a pluralistic religion, as it is open to interpretation and 
is praxiologically experienced differently in different 
contexts, but also the practice of veiling itself takes different 
shapes, colours and meanings which mirror different 
normative choices [4, 5]. The battle between ‘homogeneity’ 
and ‘plurality’ is particularly clear in the Sahin case [6] in 
which the Court repeatedly emphasized the impossibility of 
reconciling Turkey’s secular liberal and democratic values 
with extremist (Islamic) religious movements by referring to 
the Refah Party that, based on the Court’s reasoning, 
attempts to introduce sharia law which ‘would oblige 
individuals to obey static rules of law imposed by religious 
concerns’. However, the Court confused Refah 
neo-Ottomanism, which calls for a plurality of legal systems 
based on personal status, with Islamist fundamentalists who 
call for the establishment of an Islamic empire where 
jurisdiction is territorial. Indeed, with regard to the 
distinction between personal/communitarian Islamic law and 
territorial/individualistic western law, it is clear that the 
ECHR’s decision to dismantle Refah [41] was partly based 
on the ground that the party was planning to set up a plurality 
of legal systems. In the case, the Court’s ignorance of the 
plurality of Islamic traditions regarding the veil was 
compounded by its rejection of a plurality of legal systems 
within the same territory qua political unit. It is clear, 
therefore, that in seeking to forcibly expose Turkish 
women’s bodies to their natural rights the ECHR was also 
seeking to subjugate them under the logic of singular state 
sovereignty.9 
If homogeneity and unity, and not plurality, are the bases 
of democracy, then how does politics make ‘difference’ 
possible? How can the ‘right of belonging’ be imaginatively 
constructed through the image, the ‘symbol’, of the ‘other’? 
For Schmitt [20], political communities are bounded by a 
fundamental dichotomy between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, 
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ which underlines every democracy: 
“‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, ultimately, have no content in 
themselves, they are oppositional positions capable of 
unifying the members of a group” (128). Thus, a strong and 
united community needs “first homogeneity and second [the] 
elimination or eradication” (p. 9) of the ‘other’: hence, the 
very idea of democracy is based on the concept of exclusion, 
of ‘containing’/eliminating/hiding the differences and 
pluralities that ultimately threaten the monolithic character 
of liberal democracies by threatening their (imagined) 
homogeneity and unity. In fact, the people of a nation are 
bound by symbolic boundaries represented by the presence 
(as a negation) of the ‘other’ in the public sphere which 
challenges the national homogeneous identity of a people. 
Only through the identification and elimination of the 
‘enemy’ are territorial and personal boundaries secured by an 
exercise of sovereignty in defence of democracy. 
If, in the past, the ‘enemy’ was identified with the 
‘stranger’, the ‘outsider’, the ‘un-controllable’, nowadays, 
Islam has become the ‘other’ and the hijab the symbol of 
‘otherness’. In fact, since the 1970s, sociologists have 
noticed that it is not any more the category of race, but that of 
‘immigrant’, understood as “the result of their belonging to 
historical cultures” [42] (p. 22), which enables racist 
discourses: this, in turn, “entails a superimposition of 
different dimensions of ‘otherness’ that exacerbates issues of 
boundaries, accommodation and incorporation. The 
immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socio-economic 
                                                          
9 If, as stated in previous legal cases decided at the ECHR, pluralism is an 
important feature in a democratic society [56; para 31; 57, para 44), how it is 
possible to justify the fact that when the individual works or studies in public 
places she has to comply with ‘liberal’ values? If wearing a hijab creates 
tensions and conflicts, as stated in the Strasbourg decision, then the parties 
should take measures to reconcile and not to prohibit group manifestations. 
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dispriviledged ‘other’ all tend to coincide. Moreover, all 
those dimensions of ‘otherness’ now become superimposed 
upon Islam, so that Islam becomes utterly ‘other’” [43] (p. 
242). If Islam is the ‘other’, the veiled woman, who 
supposedly represents backward Islamic values incompatible 
with western democratic principles, is the symbol of this 
‘otherness’: in this way, Muslim (veiled) women have been 
forcibly included in a symbolic and imaginary dichotomy 
between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ which 
underlies every democracy. 
This is clear in the Dahlab case [7] in which the ECHR, 
instead of weighting the rights of Ms. Dahlab to wear the 
hijab with the rights and freedoms of others, presented an 
(imaginary) undefined ‘other’ in need of protection from the 
‘wrongdoing’ of Ms. Dahlab. The Court presupposed that, 
because Ms. Dahlab was working with young children and 
the student-teacher relationship is a powerful one, her hijab 
could have ‘proselytizing effects’. However, the Court did 
not find any coercive or proselytizing action carried out by 
the applicant to induce students to behave or believe in the 
same way she did. It is not clear what kind of ‘bad influence’ 
or ‘proselytizing effects’ Ms. Dahlab was exercising on 
‘vulnerable children’ since she did not even tell them that she 
had converted to Islam.10 In the Sahin case [6] the claimant 
has been presented as part of a dangerous religious 
radicalism from which the society must be defended. In the 
case, by focusing on the history of Turkey and the (supposed) 
existence of extremist religious movements attempting to 
overthrow the secular state through the reference to the Refah 
case [41], the ECHR made a mistake: it “substituted Turkey 
for the University of Istanbul and Islam for the headscarf” 
[38] (p. 279). It also failed to give evidence that wearing a 
headscarf in a higher educational institution can “pressure 
students who are not wearing the hijab” [38] (p. 279). As 
Sahin was a university student, and not a teacher in a primary 
school like Dahlab, the argument that veiling can be seen as a 
tool for proselytism is extremely weak. 
Those legal decisions illustrate how the concept of ‘radical 
otherness’ is established through the boundary expressed by 
the law. To maintain democracy, as Schmitt observes, the 
boundary between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ becomes crucial 
and the identification and expulsion of the ‘other’ from the 
public sphere necessary. As Fadil [44] puts it in relation to 
the banning of the full-face veil in Belgium, “the exclusion of 
                                                          
10 The dichotomy between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ is clear in Germany, in 
which five German Landers have allowed the display of Christian symbols, 
but not Islamic ones and in the Begum case [3] in which a young British 
student in the UK was forbidden to attend her school because she started to 
wear a jilbab and not a shalwar kameeze, considered the most appropriate 
uniform for Muslim women by three local imams. This is particularly 
indicative of western binary perceptions of Muslims as the court implied the 
existence of two kinds of Muslim: those ‘accommodated’ in 
liberal/democratic societies, and Islamic fundamentalists from whom 
western democracy has to be defended [18]. This dichotomy is also clear in a 
passage of the French resolution over the practice of veiling which stresses 
the “power and the duty we have to oppose ideologies and ways of thinking 
[symbolized by the full-face veil] that one can only qualify as ‘barbarian’, in 
the sense that they deny the idea of progress, of civilization, of democracy, 
of sex-based equality…it’s our value system which is at issue…this is our 
Republic being tested in this way.”[37]. 
face-veiled women as ‘abject other’ enables a minimal sense 
of ‘we-ness’ in the fractured Belgium but also in other 
Western-European countries where citizenship is 
increasingly cast in cultural terms” (p. 88). The history of 
clothing regulation as well as the recent legal decisions over 
the practice of veiling highlight that it is exactly through 
boundaries, expressed symbolically by the veil, that the 
(fixed) identity of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ emerges: the 
necessary exercise of sovereignty operated by the authority 
to bind women to a fixed subjectivity can be seen as an effort 
to maintain differences and, thus, a homogeneous and 
unified nation-state: “If terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism 
did not exist, they would have been invented” [45] (p. 50). 
4. Conclusions 
The obsession with the regulation of clothes, in particular 
the female veil, is not a new phenomenon in Europe; rather it 
is an integral part of western legal history through which it is 
also possible to read current European legal decisions over 
the practice of veiling. In fact, it is exactly through the study 
of clothing regulation that it is possible to understand the 
power of dress in shaping the public sphere: as I have argued, 
since clothes are located at the margin of the body, they 
symbolize the boundary between the self and the external 
world [15, 16, 17]. Through clothes it is thus possible to 
conceptualize nationality, geography and gender as a 
rhetorical form of the visible which “make[s] the world 
known to different individuals, who thereby engage, on the 
basis of such knowledge, in the ongoing refashioning of life 
in the public spaces” [46] (p. 120). In fact, the visible, unlike 
the ‘visual’ which is a simple ‘representation’, depends upon 
a symbolic order which emerges as “a rhetorical form that 
produces effects merely through what is rendered as 
‘self-evident’ or ‘natural’” [46] (p. 133). It is therefore clear 
that the legal regulation of clothes does not aim to ‘cover’ or 
‘un-cover’, but to ‘order’ and control the public sphere to 
rhetorically construct meanings and subjectivities. 
It is exactly the construction of different meanings 
attached to a particular article of clothing, such as the veil, 
that is at stake in past and present regulation of women’s 
attire: in European history, the female veil has been 
associated with women’s modesty in medieval times and 
women’s fashion in the eighteenth century, and it re-emerges 
in the colonial period as the ‘Muslim veil’; the symbol of the 
intrinsic and irreconcilable difference between west and east. 
Ironically, however, while the veil has always been regulated 
in western countries (whether by religious or secular power), 
in the ‘east’ the practice, which assumes different meanings 
based on specific cultural and historical contexts and was 
part of the Arab-Islamic tradition for centuries, started to be 
legally regulated only with the birth of nation states, apart 
from very short periods during the Abbasid era [5]. 
As, historically, western semiotic as well as nationalist 
ideology has attached specific meanings to the external 
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‘sign’, the plurality of performative practices expressed in 
the veil in Muslim majority societies has been reduced by the 
ECHR to a monolithic symbol of an intrinsic dichotomy 
between a ‘secular’ and ‘tolerant’ west and a ‘religious’ and 
‘backward’ east; after all, the history of women’s veil 
regulation in Europe reveals that even a simple piece of cloth 
such as the veil can be invested and saturated with meanings 
established by a sovereign authority through the force of the 
rules of law. 
Since the inscription of women’s bodies into the 
homogeneity of western democracy has been set by the law, 
Muslim women have been unveiled to be re-veiled with the 
mask of the unified Christian/secular law’s subject which 
emerges with her ‘new clothes’ as the image, the mirror, of a 
precise legal order, of law’s appearance in the social realm: 
“the social body, the icon and mode of civility, included and 
annexed the subject … it was the logic of the mirror, of 
mimetic duplication, of the mask or image, which is to say, 
of the father in the son” [30] (p. 89–90). In fact, if metaphors 
produce the necessary emotional attachment to legal 
obedience and political love, then the visible has to mirror a 
specific order of power and imagination and the legal subject 
should mirror a legitimate order of thought [30]: as Deleuze 
[47] points out, “the mask is the true subject of repetition. 
Such is the case because the nature of repetition differs from 
that of representation, because the repeated cannot be 
represented, but must always be signified, while masking at 
the same time that it signifies” (p. 29). 
Therefore, the legal subject comes to be formed and, at the 
same time, subjugated, by and through a specific form of 
visibility. In essence, the regulation of images and clothes in 
the public sphere emerges as the regulation of the ‘licit’ form 
of visibility and its proper reference in order to forge and 
create a specific law’s subject: “the discourse against rhetoric, 
against images, and against women…are discourses of the 
foundation of law in the definition and capture of subjectivity” 
[30] (p. x). Thus, by regulating clothes, law allows a double 
movement: on the one hand, by determining form and 
languages in advance, the rules of law form a specific 
Christian/liberal/secular citizen and its being, its desires, 
while on the other, it takes significant steps in limiting the 
personal freedom of women by representing the constructed 
desires of a majority of European people in search of an 
abstract, unified and universal identity which is formed 
through the regulation of images in the public sphere. In the 
specific case, two women have been removed from the 
public space just because their image did not conform to the 
western/secular conception of ‘liberated woman’. This not 
only reveals that in liberalism the individual emerges as an 
abstract entity who, while enjoying the allowed freedoms, is 
also subjected to the state’s rules, but it also unmasks the 
intrinsic paradoxes of positive and Human Rights law. In fact, 
if on the one hand the western secular/liberal subject of law 
enjoys a freedom guaranteed by the state, then on the other 
s/he must to be subject to state power in order for her/his 
freedom to be protected. The paradox of Human Rights law 
is also revealed by the fact that although the individual has 
‘equal rights’, those rights can be regulated to a greater or 
lesser degree depending on how abstractly or concretely the 
individual is perceived to be using these rights. This is 
particularly clear in the comparison between Dahlab [7] and 
the Kokkinakis case [56] decided at the ECHR. Kokkinakis v 
Greece involved two Jehovah’s Witnesses who were charged 
with the criminal offence of proselytizing after knocking on 
the door of diverse Greek Orthodox priests in order to try to 
convince them of the truth of their religion in a country 
where it is illegal. 11 Oddly, for the ECHR, Ms. Dahlab’s 
clothing represented a greater threat to liberty than Mr. 
Kokkinakis’s attempt to proselytize: in fact, the former was 
considered by the ECHR as a form of proselytism whiles the 
latter was not.12 While, for the Court, it was not necessary to 
regulate proselytizing actions such as that committed by 
Kokkinakis in a country where this action was considered 
illegal by the domestic Court, in Switzerland, removing a 
woman from the public space because she has started to wear 
the veil has been presented by the ECHR as a necessity to 
save the principle of ‘state neutrality’. 
Therefore, although Human Rights law claims to redeem 
humanity through the force of the law, it actually acts to 
eradicate cultural differences in the name of a fixed and 
monolithic secular/liberal law’s subject: one who is free and, 
at the same time, compelled. Likewise, on the one hand 
liberalism justifies itself by claiming a separation between 
the spiritual and the temporal, the private and the public, 
while on the other, the private life of the individual has 
become extremely regulated. In the case, in order to ‘save’ 
western secular values, some personal rights of Muslim 
women and their possibility of agency have to be limited. 
The history of clothes’ regulation in Europe shows that the 
law demonstrates anxiety “when individuals attempt to 
perform their own public face, through personal modes of 
dress and undress, in the liminal space of dress that the law 
takes to be a locus of its own dominion …When we choose to 
dress ourselves publicly in a particular way, we are 
exercising a form of self-government. We are taking control 
of our little state” [17] (p. 123). In the case, by wearing (or 
removing) a veil, the law’s subject is appropriating her right 
to regulate her own relation between her private life and the 
civil/public sphere. 
Therefore what is at stake in the legal regulation of 
women’s attire is the increasing penetration of the state (be it 
‘secular’ or ‘religious’) in the individual’s private life; in 
essence, the legal regulation of clothes mirrors the expansion 
of the regia potestas over the subject’s soul whereas “public 
reason defines a private being which only has a legitimate 
existence within the public sphere of its representation” [30] 
                                                          
11 In Greece proselytism is forbidden by constitution. For this reason, Mr 
Kokkinakis was judged guilty by the Greek Court. See Art. 13. 2 of the 
Greek constitution [59]. 
12 The Court held that the conviction of the Greek national court against Mr. 
Kokkinakis was a breach of article 9 of the ECHR because the simple 
attempt to convince others of a religious belief cannot be considered a 
breach of freedom of religion. Kokkinakis [56] (414). 
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(p. 92). This intrusion of the state in the private life of the 
individual “concerns the routine inscription and registration 
of the most private and most incommunicable element of 
subjectivity – the biopolitical life of the body” [48] (p. 201–
2) and emerges as a necessary exercise of sovereignty aimed 
at preserving political unity and homogeneity. In fact, if, as 
Schmitt argues, unity and homogeneity are formed by the 
creation of a fundamental dichotomy between ‘friend’ and 
‘enemy’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, then, as a prince and 
supreme legislator, the sovereign creates a (necessary) 
exception, a ‘disturbance’, a dichotomy symbolized 
nowadays by the (Muslim) veil, which must be rendered 
invisible by ‘exceptional’ rules of law. 
This (imagined) dichotomy, symbolized in the past as well 
as nowadays by women’s bodies, is mirrored in the current 
ECHR legal decisions over the practice of veiling which rely 
on a fixed binary opposition between a ‘tolerant’ 
Christian/secular thought, presented as a central value in 
western civilization, and a ‘un-democratic’ Islamic thought, 
presented as a threat to western democracy. It is through this 
dichotomy that homogeneity is easily attained “when the 
basic difficulty is emphatically ignored and when, for formal 
reasons, everything that contradicts the system is excluded as 
impure”[21] (p. 21). Those decisions reveal that symbols are 
constructed in order to create homogeneity in contraposition 
with an imaginary ‘enemy’, which is, at least, the ‘plurality 
of the other’: “both the imposition to learn ‘under the cross’ 
and that to learn bareheaded indicate the existence of a 
homogeneous collective identity and of outsiders, who have 
the choice between accepting to share, even symbolically, 
the values of the majority, or to be excluded from the public 
sphere”[18] (p.2666). Thus, as Gunn points out [49], 
“despite the popular beliefs that laïcité and religious freedom 
are founding principles that unite the citizens of their 
respective countries, they actually operate in ways that are 
more akin to founding myths…in current controversies 
involving religion and the state, where the doctrines are cited 
for the ostensible purpose of resolving conflicts, they 
continue to be applied in ways that divide citizens on the 
basis of their beliefs and that belittle those whose beliefs do 
not conform to popular preferences” (p. 422) In essence, 
secularism and western positive law act to eradicate 
differences and to protect a ‘secular citizen’ through the 
control of women’s body. This, in turn, reveals western 
incapacity to think juridical plurality. 
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